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RACE, SEX AND GENES AT WORK: 
UNCOVERING THE LESSONS OF NORMAN-
BLOODSAW
Elizabeth Pendo 
INTRODUCTION
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 20081
(GINA) is the first federal, uniform protection against the use of 
genetic information in both the workplace and health insurance. 
Signed into law on May 21, 2008, GINA prohibits an employer or 
health insurer from acquiring or using an individuals genetic 
information, with some exceptions. 
One of the goals of GINA is to eradicate actual, or perceived, 
discrimination based on genetic information in the workplace and in 
health insurance. Although the threat of genetic discrimination is 
often discussed in universal termsas something that could happen 
to any of usthe use of genetic information implicates other types of 
discrimination as well. Congress recognized this problem in GINAs 
legislative findings: 
 Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thank you to my fellow panelists on 
Race, Culture, Class and Health Care, at the SE/SW People of Color Legal Scholarship 
Conference hosted by Phoenix School of Law, March 28, 2009, and to Nick Brescia and Stacy 
Connelly for excellent research assistance. 
1  Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881, 881
921 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter GINA]; 42 U.S.C. § 
2000ff.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1626418
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Although genes are facially neutral markers, many genetic conditions 
and disorders are associated with particular racial and ethnic groups 
and gender. Because some genetic traits are most prevalent in 
particular groups, members of a particular group may be stigmatized 
or discriminated against as a result of that genetic information.2
Literature discussing issues of race, gender, and genetic 
information in connection with medical research and health 
insurance continues to grow.3 Less attention has been given to claims 
of genetic discrimination in the workplace.4 Now is the time to 
address that gap in the literature, particularly since GINAs 
employment provisions took effect November 21, 2009.5
In its legislative findings, Congress identified the facts of the 
1998 case Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory6 as a key 
example of genetic discrimination in the workplace.7 Norman-
Bloodsaw was the first class action suit raising privacy and 
discrimination claims related to medical and genetic testing in the 
workplace. In this piece, I focus on the story behind the Norman-
Bloodsaw case to contextualize some thoughts about the use of genetic 
information in the workplace after GINA and draw out the troubling 
connections between genetic information and classifications based on 
race and sex. Part I provides an overview of GINA, including the 
significant exceptions to the prohibition against employer acquisition 
2  GINA, supra note 1, at § 2(3). 
3 See, e.g., Vence L. Bonham, et al., Community-Based Dialog: Engaging Communities of Color in 
the United States Genetics Policy Conversation, 34 HEALTH POLY & L. 325 (2009); Mary 
Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 KAN. L. REV. 73 (2005); 
Karen Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, The Genetic Quick Fix and the Jewish Community, 7 HEALTH 
MATRIX 97 (1997). 
4  For an early account of genetic discrimination in the workplace, see generally Paul Steven 
Miller, Is there a Pink Slip in My Genes?: Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POLY 225 (2000). 
5  GINA, supra note 1, at § 213; see also The United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Background Information for EEOC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Title II 
of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_geneticinfo.html (last visited June 10, 2010) 
[hereinafter EEOC] . 
6  Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). 
7  GINA, supra note 1, at § 2(4). 
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of genetic information. In Part II, I uncover the story behind Norman-
Bloodsaw, drawing upon the published opinions and briefs, as well as 
contemporary reports in the national and local media, and a variety 
of professional publications. In Part III, I highlight two important 
points that arise from the rich context of Norman-Bloodsaw that can 
guide the interpretation of GINA in the future: genetic testing of 
workers occurs and is likely to continue even after GINA, and the 
gathering and use of genetic information in the workplace is not 
neutral and often exacerbates long-standing patterns of 
discrimination based on race and sex. 
I.  THE PROMISE OF GINA 
Norman-Bloodsaw was decided in 1998. Since that time, Congress 
has enacted GINA, the first federal, uniform protection against the 
use of genetic information in the workplace and in health 
insurance. GINA prohibits an employer or health insurer from 
discriminating on the basis of an individuals genetic information, 
with some exceptions. Title I prohibits health insurers from obtaining 
genetic information as part of the underwriting process and from 
using genetic information in making decisions relating to coverage, 
eligibility, or premiums.8 Similarly, Title II prohibits employers from 
requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information, and it also 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic information.9 Indeed, 
employers may not use genetic information to make employment 
decisions.10 Both titles define genetic information as information 
about (1) an individuals genetic tests, (2) the genetic tests of family 
8  GINA, supra note 1, at §§ 10106. 
9  GINA, supra note 1, at § 202. GINA prohibits disparate treatment based on genetic 
information, but does not currently prohibit policies or practices that have a disparate 
impact. In general, a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must show that a facially neutral 
employment practice in fact fall[s] more harshly on one group than another and cannot be 
justified by business necessity, and need not prove discriminatory intent. Intl Bhd. Of 
Teamsters v. United States, 531 U.S. 324, 33536 (1977). GINA does create a bipartisan 
commission to study this issue and make recommendations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-7. 
10  GINA, supra note 1, at § 202. According to the EEOC, this includes decisions based on 
anticipated costs of employee health plan benefits. EEOC, supra note 5. 
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members, and (3) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family 
members.11
There are important exceptions to the prohibition on employer 
acquisition of genetic information. GINA is not violated where: (1) 
the information is inadvertently provided as part of the individuals 
medical history or the medical history of a family member; (2) the 
information is provided to the employer as part of a service, such as a 
wellness program that contains certain protections in terms of 
voluntariness and confidentiality; (3) the information is provided to 
the employer as part of a request for leave under federal or state law; 
(4) the information is publicly available, as defined by the statute; (5) 
the information is gathered as part of a genetic monitoring program 
of the biological effects of toxic substances in the workplace, with 
certain safeguards; and (6) the employer operates as a law 
enforcement entity and requires the individuals DNA for quality 
control purposes in a forensic lab or human remains identification.12
Any genetic information an employer possesses must be kept 
confidential and separate from general employee records.13
Title II of GINA provides the same remedies available under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 (Title VII), including 
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, backpay, injunctive relief, 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees and 
costs.15 Title VIIs cap on damages applies, and punitive damages are 
not available against public employers.16
II. A NEW LOOK AT THE STORY OF NORMAN-BLOODSAW
Norman-Bloodsaw is significant because it is the first class action 
11  GINA, supra note 1, at §§ 102(f)(16)(A), 201(4)(A). 
12  GINA, supra note 1, at § 202(b)(1)(6). 
13  GINA, supra note 1, at § 206. 
14  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, Title VII (codified in subchapter VI of 
chapter 21 of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). 
15 Id.
16  GINA, supra note 1, at § 207; EEOC, supra note 5. 
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that claimed discrimination and invasion of privacy related to genetic 
and medical testing in the workplace. It drew national attention at the 
time of filing,17 argument,18 and decision on appeal.19 As noted 
above, it was also identified by Congress as an example of genetic 
discrimination in GINAs findings. It continues to be cited, often as a 
right to privacy case.20
Current citations to Norman-Bloodsaw in cases, legislative 
findings, and legal literature give us a sense of what the case is 
understood to mean today. But taking a closer look at the 
circumstances that surrounded this case can help us understand what 
this story meant to the people involved and their community as it 
occurred. To that end, in this section I draw upon the cases 
published opinions and briefs, contemporary reports in the national 
and local media, and a variety of professional publications in an 
17 See, e.g., Geoffrey Cowley, Flunk the Gene Test and Lose Your Insurance, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 
1996, at 49. (Employees of [LBL] recently discovered that the organization had for three 
decades been quietly testing new hires blood and urine samples for evidence of various 
conditions. They claim blacks were screened for the sickle-cell trait, Latinos for syphilis and 
women for pregnancy.); Dana Hawkins, A Bloody Mess at One Federal LabOfficials May 
Have Secretly Checked Staff for Syphilis, Pregnancy, and Sickle Cell, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
June 23, 1997, at 26. 
18 See Pamela McLean, 9th Circuit May Find New Right of Genetic, Biomedical Privacy, L.A. DAILY 
J., June 11, 1997, at 4. 
19 See Claire Cooper, Employees Privacy Rights Will Get Test  Workers Deserve Trial on Issue, 
Court Says, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 4, 1998, at A4; Rick Weiss, Genetic Tests in Workplace Can 
be Privacy Breach, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1998, at A8; Victoria Slind-Flor, Court: Workers Have 
Right to Privacy, NATL L. J., Feb. 16, 1998, at A8; Dana Hawkins, Court Declares Right to 
Genetic Privacy, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REPORT, Feb. 16, 1998, at 4; Stephanie Armour, Workers 
Fear Genetic Discrimination, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 1998, at 4B; Julie Gannon Shoop, Workers 
are Entitled to Genetic Privacy at Work, Ninth Circuit Holds, 34 TRIAL 14 (1998); Case Digests, 
Court Allows Title VII and Privacy Rights Case Against University of California, HUM.
RESOURCES L. INDEX (2000). 
20  A citation report run on November 7, 2009, showed that the Norman-Bloodsaw case had been 
cited 27 times for its holding on mootness (defendant can show that the action cannot 
reasonably be expected to recur, or that the violation has been remedied); 23 times for its 
holding on the right to privacy under federal law, state law, or both (plaintiffs did not 
authorize the test, or defendant revealed the information at issue); 4 times for its holding on 
the statute of limitations; and a few times on the question of whether Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) created a cause of action for employment 
discrimination. 
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attempt to recover the story behind the case.21
A.  Routine Examinations 
In late 1986, Marya Norman-Bloodsaw, a thirty-three year old 
African-American woman, applied for a clerical position with the 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL), a research facility operated by 
the University of California under contract with the United States 
Department of Energy (DOE).22 LBL, founded in 1931, is the oldest 
DOE National Laboratory and is located on a 200 acre site in the hills 
above the University of California, Berkeley campus.23
Since 1981, the DOE has required federal contractors such as LBL 
to establish an occupational medical program, which included 
preplacement examinations of employees. The stated objectives of 
the program were the following: 
. . . to protect employees from possible health hazards in their work 
environment; to assure placement in work that can be performed in a 
reliable and safe manner; to promote early detection, treatment and 
rehabilitation; and to apply preventative medical measures toward the 
maintenance of good physical and mental health of LBL employees 
through health promotion and education.24
The occupational medical program required preplacement 
examinations in order to determine the health status and the 
physical fitness of the individual to aid in a suitable job placement 
which would not present a health hazard of accident risk to the 
individual, other employees, plant facilities, or the public.25
21  This approach was inspired by Paul A. Lombardos work in Teaching Health Law, Law 
Archeology: Recovering the Stories behind the Cases, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 589; see also SANDRA 
H. JOHNSON ET AL., HEALTH LAW & BIOETHICS: CASES IN CONTEXT (ASPEN 2009). 
22  LBL webpage, http://www.lbl.gov/Publications/75th/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2010). 
23 Id. 
24  Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Regents of the University of California, University of 
California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Charles V. Shank, Henry H. Stauffer, 
M.D., Lisa Snow, M.D., T. F. Budinger, M.D. and William G. Donald, Jr., M.D., at 910,
Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, No. 96-16526 (9th Cir. 1997). 
[hereinafter Defendants-Appellees Brief]. 
25  Defendants-Appellees Brief, supra note 24, at 10. The order was revised effective June 26, 
1992, presumably to comply with the ADA, to require that pre-placement examinations be 
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Examinations were to be conducted in accordance with current 
sound and acceptable medical practices and include completion of a 
medical history, a physical examination, and laboratory studies.26
Until 1995, it also required contractors to offer optional subsequent 
periodic health examinations.27
Accordingly, Marya received a written offer of employment 
conditioned upon completion of a medical examination, medical 
approval, or health evaluation.28 She accepted the offer, and 
underwent a medical examination in LBLs medical department on 
December 16 or 17, 1986.29 Prior to the examination, Marya and other 
new hires filled out a medical history form, which included questions 
regarding a number of medical conditions, including venereal 
disease, sickle cell anemia, and menstrual disorders.30 During 
the examination, blood and urine samples were taken. Marya was not 
informed of the specific purpose of the blood and urine testing.31
According to news reports, workers thought they were being checked 
for high cholesterol levels or other common health problems.32 Marya 
was not provided with the results of the examination or testing.33
conducted after the offer but before performance of duties. Id.
26  Defendants-Appellees Brief, supra note 24, at 11. 
27 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1264. 
28 Id. at 1267. 
29 Id. at 1265 n.2. 
30 Id. at 1267. 
31  Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief at 12, Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, No. 
96-16526 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief]; see also Sarah Lavender 
Smith, Berkeley Lab Sued Over Medical Tests of Workers, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 14, 1995 (I had no 
idea what I was being tested for, said Marya Norman-Bloodsaw). 
32 See Samuel Greengard, Genetic Testing: Should You Be Afraid? Its No Joke, WORKFORCE, July 
1997, at 38 (All along, workers thought they were giving urine and blood samples for 
cholesterol screening.); Hawkins, supra note 17, at 26. 
33 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1265 (noting plaintiffs allegation that the tests were 
conducted without knowledge or consent, and without any subsequent notification that 
the tests had been conducted). There was an issue as to whether one employee had 
received or reviewed his test results. Id. at 1268, n.11 (Although Covingtons declaration 
states that he requests and received his medical file in 1992, he also stated that he did not 
open the envelope containing the file after receiving it. That Covington received his 
medical records in 1992 does not, therefore, resolve issues of fact as to whether he learned of 
PENDO_EIC_(RW & DH)_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/2010 10:29:43 AM 
236 HOUS. J. HEALTH L.& POL’Y
Several employees also underwent examinations before and during 
the course of their employment.34
B.  A Chance Discovery 
Eight years after that first examination, Marya requested her LBL 
medical records as part of a workers compensation case.35 According 
to news reports, she didnt think twice about the letters RPR typed 
on a page of her employee medical file. Not until her mother, a 
retired nurse, told her it was a code listing for a syphilis test.36
Marya, then a forty-one year old accounting clerk, was horrified.37
It was just hurtful, she reported. My mother, my brothers and 
sistersall of themits [sic] an intrusion into all of their lives, too.38
Marya became concerned that the testing was part of a larger, secret 
DOE experiment.39 She asked some of her colleagues to request their 
medical records to see if similar tests were conducted. 
Another named plaintiff, Vertis Ellis, reported a similar 
experience: 
Vertis Ellis remembers clearly that evening in late 1994 when she 
opened the large envelope containing her medical records from work. 
There, in large type on the top of one form, were the letters RPR  
medical code for a syphilis exam. But she has never requested or 
authorized such a test. As the 47-year old AfricanAmerican came to 
learn, her employer, [LBL], was testing employees for syphilis. She had 
also been tested for the sickle cell gene and for pregnancy, and never 
received results from any of the tests. And not just once, Ellis 
the tests before 1995.); see also Matt Fleischer, Protecting Genome Privacy Proves Hard: 
Congress is Torn Between Personal Fears, Research Needs, 22 (48) NATL L. J. (2000) (The 
doctors did tell plaintiff Mark Covington that he had high blood pressure  but they 
neglected to say that he had tested positive for sickle-cell trait as well.). 
34  Seven current and former LBL employees discovered that they had been tested for these 
conditions at numerous times before and during employment. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 
1264. 
35  Greengard, supra note 32, at 38; Hawkins, supra note 17, at 26. 
36  Tony Pugh, Medical Bias, Experiments Make Blacks Fearful, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Aug. 3, 
1998, at A1. 
37  Hawkins, supra note 17, at 27. 
38  Fleischer, supra note 33. 
39  Hawkins, supra note 17, at 26. 
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discovered as she read on, but at each of her six company exams 
during the past 29 years. I felt so violated, says Ellis. I thought, Oh, 
my god. Do they think all black women are nasty and sleep 
around?40
At least seven current and former LBL employeesincluding 
Eulalio Fuentes, Vertis Ellis, Mark Covington, John Randolph, 
Adrienne Garcia, and Brendolyn Smithdiscovered that they had 
been tested for these conditions at numerous times before and during 
employment.41 Marya and her coworkers concluded that all new 
hires at LBL were tested for syphilis, Blacks were tested for the sickle 
cell gene,42 and women were tested for pregnancy.43
C.  The District Court Decision 
Mayra and her coworkers sought the help of The Legal Aid 
Society - Employment Law Center, which litigates cases that help 
reform the legal system to better minority and low income workers, 
including issues of race, gender, and disability discrimination in the 
workplace.44 After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, 
40 Id. 
41 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 126465. According to the Ninth circuit opinion, between 
them, plaintiffs underwent fourteen examinations on dates between 1968 and 1999. Id at n.2 
(listing dates of examination(s) for each plaintiff). 
42  Sickle cell anemia is a condition in which the body makes sickle or C-shaped red blood cells 
instead of round red blood cells. The C-shaped cells can slow or block blood flow and 
oxygen to parts of the body, causing serious symptoms and complications. Sickle cell trait is 
a genetic condition in which an individual carries the gene that causes sickle cell anemia. 
The sickle cell gene is only semi-dominant, meaning that both the mother and the father 
must pass on the gene for a child to be affected. People with sickle cell trait have one normal 
hemoglobin gene and one defective form of the gene, so their blood may contain some 
sickle cells and some round cells. They generally dont experience symptoms, but they can 
pass the gene on to their children. According to the National Institutes of Health, the 
prevalence of the disease in the U.S. is approximately 1 in 5,000 people. Sickle cell anemia 
occurs in about 1 out of every 500 African American births, and 1 out of every 36,000 
Hispanic American births in the U.S. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, What is Sickle 
Cell Anemia (Aug. 2008), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/ 
Diseases/Sca/SCA_WhatIs.html. 
43  Hawkins, supra note 17, at 26. 
44 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 126667 (9th Cir. 1998); see generally Legal Aid Society, 
Employment Law Center, http://www.law-elc.org/index.html (last visited March 1, 2010). 
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Marya and six others filed the case on September 13, 1995, on behalf 
of themselves and other similarly situated employees.45
Plaintiffs named the following defendants: LBL, the LBL 
Director, four physicians in LBLs medical department, and the 
Regents of the University of California (collectively, the LBL 
Defendants), and the Secretary of the DOE.46 Based on the facts 
above, the plaintiffs asserted three claims: (1) violation of the ADA by 
requiring or assisting in medical testing that was not job-related; (2) 
violation of the right to privacy under the federal and California 
constitutions by conducting the testing, maintaining the results of the 
testing, and failing to provide adequate safeguards against 
disclosure; and (3) violating Title VII by targeting Black employees 
for sickle cell trait testing and women for pregnancy testing.47
Meanwhile, other current and former employees continued to 
request and review their LBL medical files.48 Through that process 
and the LBL defendants initial disclosures, plaintiffs learned that 
although all new hires were tested for syphilis, Black and Latino 
employees were targeted for repeat testing during the course of 
employment.49 Blacks were also targeted for repeat testing for sickle 
cell trait, and women for repeat testing for pregnancy.50 Plaintiffs 
moved to amend their complaint to include a claim for 
discrimination under Title VII in connection with the race-targeted 
retesting for syphilis.51
While that motion was pending and prior to full discovery, the 
45  Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 23; Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1265. 
46 See Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 1. The LBL Director is Charles V. Shank; 
physicians in LBLs medical department are Henry H. Stauffer, M.D., Lisa Snow, M.D., T. F. 
Budinger, M.D., William G. Donald, Jr., M.D., and the Regents of the University of 
California are all collectively, the LBL Defendants. Id. They also named Federico Pena, 
Secretary of the Department of Energy (The Federal Defendant). Id.
47  NormanBloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 126566; Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 2. 
48 See NormanBloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1265 n.5; Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 23. 
49  Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 2, 3839. 
50  Hawkins, supra note 17, at 26. 
51 See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1265 n.5; Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 39. 
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LBL defendants moved for summary judgment.52 The district court 
granted defendants motion in full on June 10, 1996, dismissing 
plaintiffs claims.53 Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend the 
complaint only if they could allege unauthorized disclosure of the 
results of the tests.54 The primary basis for the district courts 
dismissal was that plaintiffs claims were time-barred because the 
limitations period began to run at the time the tests were 
conductedthe latest test was conducted on August 16, 1993.55 In the 
alternative, the court found the privacy and Title VII claims were 
without merit.56
As to the ADA claims, the district court held that the medical 
history questionnaires inquired into areas such as venereal disease, 
sickle cell anemia, and menstrual problems, and thus put 
employees on notice that the testing was not job-related or consistent 
with business necessity.57 Given that the most recent examination of 
any named plaintiff occurred over two years before the filing of the 
complaint,58 any claims under the ADA were therefore time-barred.59
The court also rejected the argument that maintenance of the test 
results in employee medical files constituted a continuing violation 
of the ADA that tolled the limitations period.60
The district court held that the privacy claims under federal and 
state law were barred by the one-year statute of limitation.61 The 
court found that the blood and urine analysis occurred as part of a 
52  Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 4. 
53 Id.
54 Id. 
55 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1265 n.2, 1266. 
56 Id. at 1266. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1266 n.6. It was undisputed that only two of the plaintiffs, Garcia and Fuentes, 
underwent examinations after January 26, 1992, the effective date of the ADA. Id.
59 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1266. 
60 Id.
61 Id. (citing Trotter v. Intl Longshoreman & Warehousemens Union, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 
1983)) (stating that all privacy claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations under 
California law). 
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comprehensive medical examination to which the plaintiffs had 
consented, and that each had completed a medical history form 
including highly personal questions, including inquiries 
concerning venereal disease, sickle cell anemia, and menstrual 
problems.62 The court concluded that plaintiffs were aware at the 
time of their examinations of sufficient facts to put them on notice 
that their blood and urine would be tested for syphilis, sickle cell 
trait, and pregnancy.63 Because the lawsuit was filed more than one 
year after the last medical examination of a named plaintiff,64 the 
claims were time-barred.65
In the alternative, the district court held that the testing had not 
violated plaintiffs due process right to privacy because the testing 
for syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy covered the same area 
as the medical history questionnaire.66 Although defendants failed to 
identify any legitimate governmental purpose for the tests, any 
additional incremental intrusion from the tests was so minimal that 
no constitutional violation could have occurred.67
Finally, the court held that the Title VII claims were time-barred 
for the same reasons the privacy and ADA claims were time-barred.68
It also concluded that plaintiffs had failed to state a cognizable Title 
VII claim because they had failed to show harmplaintiffs had 
neither alleged nor shown any connection between these 
discontinued confidential tests and [their] employment terms of 
conditions, either in the past or in the future.69
 D. The Appellate Court Opinion 
On appeal, plaintiffs sought reversal of the district courts order 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1265 n.2 (listing examination date for Garcia). 
65 Id. at 1266. 
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. 
69 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1266. 
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granting the LBL Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings 
or motions for summary judgment, and the DOEs motion to 
dismiss.70 The appellate court found significant factual questions that 
precluded the grant of summary judgment as to the federal and state 
constitutional privacy claims and the Title VII claims, and the 
appellate court remanded the case to the district court for 
proceedings consistent with its ruling.71 The appellate court 
addressed the four following key issues in developing its opinion. 
1. Statute of Limitations 
The appellate court first addressed the statute of limitations issue 
as to all of the claims. The general federal rule is that a limitations 
period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know 
of the injury which is the basis of the action.72 The appellate court 
noted that the district court had not clearly stated why the plaintiffs 
knew or had reason to know of the injury before the end of the 
statutory period, but determined that the district court must have 
reasoned that the plaintiffs knew or should have known about the 
specific testing because plaintiffs submitted to medical examinations, 
answered related questions on the medical history questionnaire, and 
gave blood and urine samples.73
The appellate court disagreed, holding that whether plaintiffs 
knew or had reason to know of the specific testing turns on material 
issues of fact that can only be resolved at trial.74 Indeed, the 
appellate court observed that [t]he record strongly suggests that 
plaintiffs submission to the exam did not serve to afford them notice 
of the particular testing involved.75
70 Id.; Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 34. 
71 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 127576. 
72 Id. at 1266 (citing Trotter v. Intl Longshoremans & Warehousemens Union, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 
(9th Cir. 1983)). 
73 Id. at 1267 n.8. Defendants contend that for many years signs posted in the health 
examination rooms and, more recently, in the reception area stated the tests at issue would 
be administered. Id. at 1265. 
74 Id. at 1267. 
75 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1267. 
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Concerning what plaintiffs knew, the appellate court noted that 
plaintiffs denied that they were informed of the nature of the tests to 
be performed.76 It then stated that the letters sent by LBL provided 
that a medical examination, medical approval, or health 
evaluation was a condition of employment and did not inform 
plaintiffs that they would be subjected to comprehensive diagnostic 
medical examination, which would inquire into intimate health 
matters that were unrelated to their responsibilities as administrative 
or clerical employees.77
In the absence of evidence of actual notice, the appellate court 
focused on whether plaintiffs reasonably should have expected that 
blood and urine testing for syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy 
would be part of an occupational medical examination performed 
according to generally accepted medical practice.78 The appellate 
court noted that [t]he record, indeed, contains considerable evidence 
that the manner in which the tests were performed was inconsistent 
with sound medical practice.79
The issue of reasonable expectations is complicated by the fact 
that from 1976 to 1992, the DOE required contractors like LBL to test 
for syphilis as part of the occupational medical program.80 That order 
was cancelled and replaced with another as of June 22, 1992, which 
provided that laboratory studies may include urinalysis and 
76 Id at 126667. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1267. 
79 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1267; see also Appellants Reply Brief at 7, Norman-Bloodsaw 
v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab, No. 96-16526 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Reply] (noting that the defendants failed to find a single independent physician who 
supports occupational testing for syphilis, sickle cell, or pregnancy, or who has actual 
knowledge of another employer administering such tests.). Moreover, the court noted, the 
experts further agreed that generally accepted standards of occupational medicine 
require employers to inform their employees of the tests to be performed to specify whether 
the tests are a condition of employment, and provide notification of the results. Norman-
Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1267. 
80  DOE orders required institutions to include syphilis testing in its medical examinations 
from 1975 until 1992 in accordance with generally accepted medical practice. See Brief of 
Federal Appellee, Secretary of Energy Hazel OLeary at 56, 15, Norman-Bloodsaw v. 
Lawrence Berkeley Lab, No. 96-16526 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter DOE Brief]. 
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serology when indicated.81 However, there was no evidence that the 
DOE required testing for sickle cell trait or pregnancy, or 
recommended that testing for syphilis be race-targeted.82
Finally, the appellate court rejected defendants argument that 
the medical history form, which included questions regarding a 
number of medical conditions, including venereal disease, sickle 
cell anemia, and menstrual disorders, put plaintiffs on notice of 
testing for syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy. The appellate 
court held, it is not reasonable to infer that a person who answers a 
questionnaire upon personal knowledge is put on notice that his 
employer will take intrusive means to verify the accuracy of his 
answers.83 The appellate court then turned to the merits of the 
claims. 
2. The Privacy Claims 
The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the privacy claims 
under federal and state law, holding that material issues of fact exist 
with respect to whether the defendants had any interest at all in 
obtaining the information and whether plaintiffs had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the circumstances.84 The appellate 
court explained that when adjudicating privacy claims like the 
plaintiffs, it must balance the defendants interests in conducting the 
tests against the plaintiffs expectations of privacy while considering 
81  The reason given for the cancellation was limited usefulness for screening health 
populations for the presence of syphilis. DOE Brief, supra note 80, at 7 n.2. In its brief, the 
DOE argued that the claims against it were moot because the only testing the DOE ever 
required was syphilis testing, the order requiring such testing was cancelled on June 22, 
1992 and replaced with an order that required testing of blood and urine when indicated. 
The court rejected this argument. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1274. 
82 See DOE Brief, supra note 80, at 56. At LBL, testing for sickle cell trait was done as early as 
1968 and continued until 1995 because, in the opinion of the LBL Medical Director, the 
inclusion of such a test in a general medical examination was consistent with good medical 
practices. Defendants-Appellees Brief, supra note 24, at 14. LBL discontinued syphilis 
testing in April 1993, and mandatory pregnancy testing in December 1994. See Norman-
Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1265. 
83 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F. 3d at 1268. 
84 Id. at 1271. 
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the degree of intrusiveness, the states interest requiring the 
intrusion, and the efficacy of the intrusion to meet the states 
interest.85
As to the federal claim, the appellate court stated that performing 
unauthorized medical tests is one of the most basic violations of the 
right to privacy, opining, [o]ne can think of few subject areas more 
personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than that of 
ones health or genetic make-up.86 It also noted that the need for 
protection is even greater when the testing reveals intimate 
information relating to family and sexual history, as well as 
reproductive decision-making.87
The appellate court also rejected the argument that the additional 
intrusion of the tests, in the context of a general medical exam, was so 
minimal that the government need not demonstrate a legitimate 
interest, or in the alternative, that the additional intrusion was so 
minimal that the plaintiffs privacy interest was outweighed by the 
governments legitimate interest in performing pre-placement 
examinations.88 The only legitimate interest offered for the tests was a 
statement by the LBL Medical Director that such tests were consistent 
with good medical practices.89 The appellate court ruled the 
governments legitimate interest was not sufficient to outweigh 
plaintiffs privacy interest because the existence of the governments 
interest in performing pre-placement examinations depended upon 
an assumptionthe pre-placement examinations were part of an 
ordinary general medical examinationthat the appellate court had 
rejected when it ruled plaintiffs had not been put on notice about the 
tests. 
The court reached a similar conclusion with respect to the state 
privacy claim.90 The appellate court noted, [t]he only possible 
85 Id. at 1269. 
86 Id.
87  Id. at 126970. 
88  Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F. 3d at 1269. 
89 Id.; Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 22. 
90  The California Constitution recognizes a right to privacy. CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 1. The 
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difference . . . is the threshold requirement that the invasion be 
serious, and for purposes of summary judgment, that requirement 
has been more than met.91
3.  Title VII 
The appellate court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs claims 
under Title VII. Title VII prohibits employment practices that 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individuals race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin.92 In 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title 
VII to clarify that discrimination because of sex included 
discrimination because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions.93 Although Title VII does not generally 
prohibit an employer from conducting or requiring medical 
examinations of employees, it does prohibit the imposition of medical 
examinations (or any other terms or conditions) upon an employee or 
group of employees based on membership in a protected class.94
In this case, plaintiffs alleged that the use of testing to 
selectively invade the constitutional rights of women and 
minorities95 violated Title VII.96 The LBL Defendants did not dispute 
that they singled out certain employees for the tests at issue based on 
sex and race, but argued that plaintiffs could show no tangible job 
elements of a claim for invasion of privacy under California law are: (1) the existence of a 
legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (3) conduct 
by the defendant constituting a serious invasion. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1271 (citing 
Hill v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn., 865 P.2d 633, 657 (Cal. 4th 1994)). 
91 Id. at 1271. 
92  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
93  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
94 See generally Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008); Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 
34. 
95  Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 34. 
96 See Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 33536 n.15 (1977). A plaintiff 
alleging disparate treatment must show that her employer intentionally treated her 
differently than other employees because of her sex. See generally McDonnell Douglass 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (discussing a prima facie case of disparate treatment). 
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detriment as a result of the testing.97
The appellate court reversed the district courts grant of 
summary judgment for LBL on the Title VII claims, holding that 
plaintiffs had stated a claim under Title VII.98 The appellate court 
reasoned that: 
the employment of women and blacks at [LBL] was conditioned in part 
on allegedly unconstitutional invasions of privacy to which white 
and/or male employees were not subjected. An additional term or 
condition requiring an unconstitutional invasion of privacy is, without 
doubt, actionable under Title VII. Furthermore, even if the intrusions 
did not rise to the level of unconstitutionality, they would still be a 
term or condition based on an illicit category as decried by the 
statute and this a proper basis for a Title VII action.99
4. The ADA Claims 
The appellate court upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs claims 
under the ADA,100 which provides that no employer shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because 
of the disability of such individual in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment.101 Although the ADA does not 
explicitly address genetic conditions or genetic testing, it does restrict 
the employers ability to make disability-related inquiries102 and 
97 See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1272; Defendants-Appellees Brief, supra note 24, at 59. 
98 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1272. 
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1274. 
101  42 U.S.C § 12112(a) (2008). 
102 According to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a 
disability-related question is a question (or series of questions) that is likely to elicit 
information about a disability, including questions concerning genetic information. See 
generally, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMN, ABA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
PREEMPLOYMENT DISABILITY-RELATED QUESTIONS AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS, EEOC,
Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 10, 1995) [hereinafter PREEMPLOYMENT QUESTIONS & MEDICAL 
EXAMINATIONS], http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/medfin5.pdf.
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conduct medical examinations,103 which may include blood, urine, 
saliva, and hair analyses to detect disease or genetic markers (e.g., for 
conditions such as sickle cell trait, breast cancer, Huntingtons 
disease).104
The ADA creates three categories of medical inquiries and 
examinations by employers: those made pre-offer, post-offer, and 
during employment.105 Before an offer is made, an employer is 
generally prohibited from asking disability-related questions or 
requiring a medical examination whether or not relevant to the job.106
After an offer is made, the employer can request a medical 
examination as a condition of starting work.107 At this point, an 
employer may make disability-related inquiries and conduct medical 
examinations, regardless of whether they are related to the job, as 
long as it does so for all entering employees in the same job 
category.108 During employment, an employer many request medical 
information and require medical examinations that are job-related 
and consistent with business necessity.109 At all times, the 
information must be treated as a confidential medical record,110 and it 
may not be used as a basis for prohibited discrimination.111
103  According to the EEOC, a medical examination is a procedure or test that seeks 
information about an individuals physical or mental impairment or health. 
PREEMPLOYMENT QUESTIONS & MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS, supra note 102, at 13. 
104  U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMN, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON 
DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (June. 27, 2000), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html. 
105  42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(4) (2008); Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1273. 
106  42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2008); see also 29 C.F.R. §§1630.13(a), 1630.14 (1998); PREEMPLOYMENT 
QUESTIONS & MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS, supra note 102, at 58. 
107  42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2008). 
108 Id. However, if an individual is screened out because of a disability, the employer must 
show that the exclusionary criterion is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.10, 1630.14(b)(3) (1998). 
109  42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2008); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (1998). 
110  42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (2008). 
111  42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(4)(C), (d)(1) (2008) (medical examinations and inquiries must be 
consistent with the general prohibitions in section 12112(a) against discrimination on the 
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Only two of the named plaintiffs were subjected to medical 
examinations after the effective date of the ADA, and both were post-
offer, pre-placement exams.112 Accordingly, the court held that 
plaintiffs did not state a claim under the ADA because examinations 
conducted after an offer has been made but prior to beginning work 
need not be limited to job-related functions.113 Plaintiffs ADA claims 
also failed because they did not offer any evidence that defendants 
improperly disclosed or made use of the tests information.114
E.  Settlement 
In sum, the appellate court found significant factual questions 
that precluded the grant of summary judgment as to the federal and 
state constitutional privacy claims and the Title VII claims, and 
remanded the case to the district court for proceedings consistent 
with its ruling. 
The parties then reached a settlement agreement totaling $2.2 
million.115 Pursuant to the agreement, the defendants agreed to 
implement new procedures prohibiting testing without informed 
consent of the employees, giving current and former employees the 
right to review their medical files, and the right to expunge any 
testing information related to syphilis, pregnancy or any tests, 
positive or negative, for the sickle-cell trait.116
III. THOUGHTS ON GENETIC INFORMATION AT WORK AFTER 
basis of disability); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (1998) (if the results of the examination 
exclude an individual on the basis of disability, the exclusionary criteria must be job-
related and consistent with business necessity). 
112 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1273; Defendants-Appellees Brief, supra note 24, at 5. 
113 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1273. 
114 Id. at 1274. 
115  Pamela A. MacLean, Lawrence Labs Reaches 2.2M Accord in Biological Privacy Case, L.A. DAILY 
J., Dec. 10, 1999, at 1. 
116  Id. at 2. Fleischer, supra note 33, at A1 (The [9th Circuit] stingingly rebuked the lab last 
year, and at a July 13 hearing, the lab said that it had agreed to restrictive consent rules for 
the use of genetic information, to the imposition of a monitor and to a $4,050 payout to each 
of the plaintiffs.). 
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GINA 
There is disagreement about the extent of genetic discrimination 
that occurred prior to GINA. Some have characterized GINA as a 
preemptive statute, arguing there is little evidence that 
discrimination based on genetic information occurs.117 Others point 
to the considerable amount of anecdotal evidence of genetic 
discrimination in a variety of contexts.118 I wont settle that debate 
here. I offer that the experiences of Marya Norman-Bloodsaw and her 
coworkers show that genetic testing in the workplace does impact 
real people. According to news reports, the class of employees and 
job applicants affected by the settlement in the Norman-Bloodsaw case 
stretched back 27 years to 1972 and involve[d] as many as 8,000 
people.119 Moreover, a 2004 survey conducted by the American 
Management Association found that 3% of responding companies 
reported testing for breast or colon cancer, 2% for sickle cell anemia, 
and 1% for Huntingtons diseaseall of which can have genetic 
links.120 Approximately 15% of responding companies also collected 
family medical histories, which can reveal genetic information about 
the employee and his or her family.121 While the numbers may 
appear relatively small, they suggest that the situation in Norman-
Bloodsaw is not an isolated incident. 
117 See, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
118 See generally id. at 2529 (summarizing cases and anecdotal evidence of genetic 
discrimination); Miller, supra note 4, at 23237 (summarizing evidence of discrimination by 
employers); Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability 
Insurance: Ethics, Law & Policy, 35 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 6 (2007); Paul R. Billings et al., 
Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476 (1992); Karen 
Kaplan, U.S. Military Practices Genetic Discrimination in Denying Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2007, at A1; Shaun Assael, Genetic Property: A new law protecting genetic information could but 
heads with an MLB policy, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, Oct. 7, 2009, at 12 (discussing the 2005 case 
in which the Chicago Bulls refused to extend the contract of NBA forward Eddy Curry 
unless he took a genetic test for susceptibility to cardiomyopathy). 
119  Pamela MacLean, Keeping Your Genes Zipped: Congress Slow to Adopt Genetic Privacy 
Protections (July 27, 2000), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/keeping-your-genes-
zipped. 
120  AM. MGMT ASSN, AMA 2004 WORKPLACE TESTING SURVEY: MEDICAL TESTING 2 (2004). 
121 Id.
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In addition, completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003 
raised the stakes, as clinical genetic tests are becoming available at a 
rapid rate, with 1,798 clinical genetic tests currently available.122 It is 
fair to say that the risk of genetic discrimination increases as genetic 
tests become more available, and genetic information is more 
commonly included in medical records. 
Does GINA solve the problem? I would like to highlight two 
important points from the story of Norman-Bloodsaw that can inform 
our answer to that question, and guide the interpretation of GINA. 
First, genetic testing of workers occurs, and genetic information is 
likely to remain available to employers even after GINA. Second, the 
collection and use of genetic information in the workplace is not 
neutral, and often exacerbates long-standing patterns of 
discrimination based on race and sex. 
A.  Genetic Information in the Workplace 
If Norman-Bloodsaw were decided today, it appears that LBLs 
policy of testing employees for sickle cell trait would violate GINA, 
although testing for pregnancy, syphilis, and other non-genetic 
conditions would not. However, genetic testing and access to genetic 
information in the workplace is likely to continue even after GINA. 
GINA generally prohibits an employer from acquiring or using 
an employees genetic information. In particular, GINA closes the 
gap left by the ADA for post-offer, pre-placement medical testing. 
According to the EEOC, employers are no longer permitted to obtain 
any genetic information, including family medical history, from post-
offer applicants.123 However, if an employee submits to a medical 
examination and signs an authorization for the release of his or her 
medical records, the employer could incidentally acquire genetic 
information contained in the medical record, as currently there is no 
consistent, reliable method for segregating genetic information from 
122  GeneTests.org, http://genetests.org (last visited May 20, 2010).  
123  Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 
9056, 9061 (proposed Mar. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1635). 
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general medical information.124
As noted above, there are exceptions to the prohibition against 
employer acquisition of genetic information. Notably, GINA permits 
genetic monitoring or periodic examination of employees for the 
purpose of monitoring the effects of exposure to workplace toxins.125
This exception is subject to strict requirements, as genetic monitoring 
may occur only if: 
(A) the employer provides written notice of the genetic monitoring to 
the employee; 
(B) (i) the employee provides prior, knowing, voluntary and written 
authorization; or (ii) the genetic monitoring is required by Federal or 
State law; 
(C) the employee is informed of individual monitoring results; 
(D) the monitoring is in compliance with 
(i) any Federal genetic monitoring regulations, including any such 
regulations that may be promulgated by the Secretary of Labor 
pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 
651 et seq.), the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C. 
801 et seq.), or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); 
or 
(ii) State genetic monitoring regulations, in the case of a State that is 
implementing genetic monitoring regulations under the authority of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.); 
and 
(E) the employer, including any licensed health care professional or 
board certified genetic counselor that is involved in the genetic 
monitoring program, received the results of the monitoring only in 
aggregate terms that do not disclose the identity of specific 
employees.126
The record strongly suggests that the testing in Norman-Bloodsaw
was without knowledge or consent, the tested employees were not 
124 See Mark Rothstein, GINA, the ADA and Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 36 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 837, 83738 (2008). 
125  42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(5) (2008). 
126 Id. 
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provided with the results of testing, and the results were disclosed 
and maintained by the employer in a manner that identified the 
employees. However, at least some of the testing was done pursuant 
to DOEs mandatory occupational medical program, which was 
justified at least in part on safety grounds. According to the DOE, the 
occupational medical program required pre-placement examinations 
in order to determine the health status and the physical fitness of 
the individual for placement purposes, and to avoid placements 
which would present a health hazard or accident risk to the 
individual, other employees, plant facilities, or the public.127 There 
were also some suggestions by LBL that it conducted the testing for 
safety reasons, although these were less convincing.128
The Norman-Bloodsaw experience suggests that we should be 
skeptical of safety justifications in general, including where required 
by state or federal authorities. It also suggests that genetic testing and 
the use of genetic information in the workplace must be scrutinized 
carefully despite the veneer of scientific objectivity. Scholars have 
made similar arguments with regard to other types of testing used to 
select and screen workers, including psychological testing, drug 
testing, and general medical testing.129 We need to ask these 
questions again with respect to GINAs exceptions. 
127  Defendants-Appellees Brief, supra note 24, at 10. 
128  LBL spokesman Ron Kolb also reported to the press that the tests were a service to 
employees and helped identify workers who could not be assigned to areas where radiation 
or other hazards were present. Claire Cooper, Appeals Court Says Lab Workers Entitled to 
Trial on Secret Testing, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERV., Feb. 4, 1998. In their brief, the LBL 
Defendants asserted that [o]ver the years LBL has attempted to educate employees to the 
risk which radiation poses to reproduction and the specific risks which radiation poses to 
the fetus. Defendants-Appellees Brief, supra note 24, at 15. 
129 See, e.g., ELAINE DRAPER, RISKY BUSINESS: GENETIC TESTING AND EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES IN 
THE HAZARDOUS WORKPLACE 1520 (1991) [hereinafter RISKY BUSINESS]; Elaine Draper, The 
Screening of America: The Social and Legal Framework of Employers Use of Genetic Information, 20 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 286, 291 (1999) [hereinafter The Screening of America]; Sharona 
Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness: How to Enhance Privacy and Diminish 
Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 517 (2001); Susan J. Stabile, The Use of 
Personality Tests as a Hiring Tool: Is the Benefits Worth the Cost?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB & EMP. L. 279 
(2002). 
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B.  Connections to Race and Sex Discrimination 
The story behind Norman-Bloodsaw also illustrates that the 
acquisition and use of genetic information in the workplace is not 
neutral, and often reflects and reinforces long-standing patterns of 
stratification by race and sex. As suggested by one author, [s]ocial 
stratification and discrimination are major problems with genetic 
information, in part because the layering of our society by race and 
ethnicity, gender, and social class affects the ways in which such 
information is used.130 In other words, the use of genetic 
information is not entirely separate from existing patterns of race and 
sex discrimination, rather these can be interlocking systems of 
classification and discrimination in the workplace. 
Norman-Bloodsaw is often cited as a right to privacy case,131 which 
tends to obscure the race- and sex-based targeting of LBLs testing. 
LBL singled out blacks for sickle cell testing, and blacks and Latinos 
for repeated syphilis testing. As explained by the plaintiffs: 
the testing of all African-American employees for sickle cell trait and 
disease, and the disproportionate testing of African-American and 
Latino employees for syphilis label these employees as more likely to 
be carriers of sexually transmitted disease as well as genetic traits 
deemed undesirable, on the basis of race and national origin, and thus 
adversely affect the status of the plaintiffs.132
The implication that some employees were more likely to be 
exposed to syphilis was not lost on the employeesas noted above 
one female employee, Vernon Ellis, said she felt violated by LBLs 
conduct, which implied that all black women are nasty and sleep 
around.133 The theme of sexual contagion was also suggested by 
another news report, noting that [t]he workers say the repeated 
testing was not performed on the blood samples of white male 
employees, with one notable exception: a white man married to a 
130 The Screening of America, supra note 129, at 291. 
131 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
132  Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 44. 
133  Hawkins, supra note 17, at 26. 
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black woman was repeatedly screened for syphilis.134
Women were also singled out for pregnancy testing, purportedly 
in connection with reproductive harms, although there was no 
indication that women were exposed to reproductive harms in the 
workplace, or that men were not similarly subject to any such 
harms.135
The race- and gender-targeted testing at LBL suggests that we 
need to ask what types of workers get tested, for what conditions, 
and why. These questions are important, as GINA does not speak to 
the targeted nature of the testing in Norman-Bloodsaw, nor does it 
reach every place where discrimination occurs.136
The story of Norman-Bloodsaw also connects to the well-known 
history of medical professionals exploiting communities of color, and 
the resulting distrust of medicine and medical testing within those 
communities.137 The only genetic test conducted by LBL was for 
sickle cell trait. In their brief, the plaintiffs noted the history of 
stigmatization and discrimination against carriers of sickle cell trait, 
including narrowing of economic opportunities, including exclusion 
from military aircrews.138 The history of stigma and discrimination 
134 Id. 
135 See RISKY BUSINESS, supra note 129, at 65 (discussing social construction of fetal protection 
policies and stratification by sex in the workplace). In addition, at least one news report 
noted the potential link between genetic information and gender discrimination. Marian 
Raab, Genetic Shakeup, WORKING WOMAN, Oct. 1998, at 14 (stating that [w]omen are 
particularly vulnerable if employers begin to use the tests routinely because breast cancer 
runs in families.). 
136  GINA applies only to employment and health insuranceit does not prohibit the use of 
genetic information on other forms of insurance, such as life, disability or long-term care 
insurance. See Wolf & Kahn, supra note 118, at 6; Billings et al., supra note 118, at 476. It also 
does not reach other contexts in which the use of genetic information has been problematic, 
including the military and professional sports. See Kaplan, supra note 118, at A1; Assael, 
supra note 118, at 12. 
137 See Vernillia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism: Trusting the Health Case System Aint 
Always Easy! An African American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 191, 
19192 (1996); Vence L. Bonham, et al., Community-Based Dialogue: Engaging Communities of 
Color in the United States Genetics Policy Conversation, 34 HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 325, 32528 
(2009). 
138  Plaintiffs-Appellants Reply, supra note 79, at 2122 (citing Lori Andrews, Medical Genetics: 
A Legal Frontier 1824 (ABA 1987); see also V.M. VOGLE, ET AL., Sickle Cell Anemia Trait in the 
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associated with sickle cell trait and disease also was specifically noted 
by Congress in GINAs findings: 
discrimination was evident in the 1970s, which saw the advent of 
programs to screen and identify carriers of sickle cell anemia, a disease 
which afflicts African-Americans. Once again, State legislatures began 
to enact discriminatory laws in the area, and in the early 1970s began 
mandating genetic screening of all African Americans for sickle cell 
anemia, leading to discrimination and unnecessary fear. To alleviate 
some of this stigma, Congress in 1972 passed the National Sickle Cell 
Anemia Control Act, which withholds Federal funding from States 
unless sickle cell testing is voluntary.139
Upon discovery of the testing, Marya Norman-Bloodsaw 
wondered if the tests were part of a larger, secret [DOE] 
experiment.140 It was undisputed that at the time of the appeal the 
testing results were still held at LBL, and there was some suggestion 
that the results were used for research. According to the plaintiffs, 
documents disclosed by LBL indicated that the U.S. Department of 
Energy regarded LBL employee medical files as valuable 
epidemiologic research records.141 The connections to a shameful 
history of exploitation were not lost on the media, which referenced 
the history of sickle cell trait and disease as well as the infamous 
Tuskegee experiment.142 In the words of one of the named plaintiffs, 
Military Aircrew Population: A Report from the Military Aviation Safety Subcommittee of the 
Aviation Safety Committee, ASMA, AVIATION, SPACE AND ENVIRON. MED. (1991)). 
139  GINA, supra note 1; see generally, KEITH WAILOO & STEPHEN PEMBERTON, THE TROUBLED 
DREAM OF GENETIC MEDICINE: ETHNICITY AND INNOVATION IN TAY-SACHS, CYSTIC FIBROSIS 
AND SICKLE CELL DISEASE 11660 (2006) (Ch. 3 describes the social history of testing and 
treatment for sickle cell trait and disease). 
140  Hawkins, supra note 17, at 27. 
141  Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief, supra note 31, at 2. This was also reported in the press. Hawkins, 
supra note 17, at 27 (According to a guidebook that the [DOE] gave to contractors like 
[LBL], testing for health problems is performed to determine the fitness of applicants and as 
part of a health maintenance program. The document also states that the medical records of 
employees are considered valuable epidemiological research records. This sentence has led 
some workers to suspect that they were part of a study to track the disease patterns of 
minorities . . . . This is the second time in recent years that the DOE has been accused of 
testing people without consent. During the cold war, UC-Berkeley scientists secretly 
injected mental patients and prisoners with plutonium to study human biology.). 
142 See also Pugh, supra note 36, at A01; Tony Pugh, Minorities Distrust Medical Test Concerns: 
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Mark Covington, Its disgusting . . . . It goes back to the time when 
blacks were treated like filthy animals, and they wanted to make sure 
we werent contaminating their environment.143
Fears may have been heightened by the fact that LBL was not an 
unsophisticated employer. LBL is the oldest DOE National 
Laboratory, and has been home to ten Nobel Laureates and the site of 
multiple scientific achievements, several of which are connected with 
genetic research. It was named one of two DOE centers for the 
mapping and sequencing of the Human Genome and played roles in 
the identification of a heart disease gene, the first view of DNA 
double-helix, and the development of sickle cell and down-syndrome 
transgenic mice.144 In addition, DOE funded research into the misuse 
of genetic testing in the 1990s. As noted by Professor Mark Rothstein 
at the time of the Norman-Bloodsaw case, Lawrence Berkeley should 
have known better . . . . To have one of their labs on the wrong end of 
a suit like this has to be embarrassing.145
CONCLUSION
Recovering the story behind the Norman-Bloodsaw case highlights 
important points about the use of genetic information at work. It 
reminds us that the genetic testing work does occur, and thinking 
about how the case would be decided today illustrates the limits of 
GINAs protections. Indeed, in the context of workplace 
discrimination, it may be helpful to think of GINA as a new layer in 
the scheme of overlapping protections provided by existing 
antidiscrimination laws, including Title VII and the ADA, an idea I 
plan to develop in future writings. The story behind Norman-Bloodsaw
Wariness of Health-Care Establishment Remains a Real Problem with Serious Health Consequences, 
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Aug. 6, 1998, at 13A (Incidents like the Berkeley lab case only further 
the suspicion); Tony Pugh, Blacks Remain Uneasy About Health Care System, FORT WORTH 
STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug 10, 1998, at 1; Greengard, supra note 32, at 38 (referring to the case as a 
public relations nightmare and tying to the history of discrimination against people with 
sickle-cell trait). 
143  Hawkins, supra note 17, at 27. 
144  LBL webpage, http://www.lbl.gov/Publications/75th/. 
145  Bob Holmes, Gene Invasion, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 14, 1998, at 1010. 
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also reminds us that genetic testing of workers can reflect and 
reinforce pre-existing patterns of discrimination and stigmatization. 
As genetic information will likely continue to be available to 
employers through GINAs exceptions, we need to remember the 
lessons of Norman-Bloodsaw to avoid making the same mistakes in the 
future. 
